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House of Representatives

The House met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PAULSEN).

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

WASHINGTON, DC.

November 2, 2011.

I hereby appoint the Honorable ERIK PAULSEN to act as Speaker pro tempore on this day.

JOHN A. BOEHNER,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

MORNING-HOUR DEBATE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of January 5, 2011, the Chair will now recognize Members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning-hour debate.

The Chair will alternate recognition between the parties, with each party limited to 1 hour and each Member other than the majority and minority leaders and the minority whip limited to 5 minutes each, but in no event shall debate continue beyond 11:50 a.m.

UMWA UPPER BIG BRANCH REPORT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. GEORGE MILLER) for 5 minutes.

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, last week the United Mine Workers of America released the results of their investigation into the deadliest coal mine tragedy in four decades. The report describes the conditions on April 5, 2010 in Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch mine that led to a colossal explosion killing 29 miners. It confirms

the findings of two other independent investigations.

In short, Massey's failure to eliminate explosive coal dust throughout the mine converted an otherwise manageable methane fire into a catastrophic explosion. The force of this explosion traveled more than 7 miles underground, destroying everything in its path. Miles of coal belts were decimated, railroad tracks were twisted like pretzels, and massive mining equipment was tossed underground like lawn furniture during a hurricane.

The report noted that in the 15 months before the explosion, the mine was cited 645 times for violations of mine safety laws. They faced \$1.2 million in potential fines. However, rather than improving safety, Massey challenged three-quarters of the fines. And in the month before the explosion, miners had asked that the accumulation of explosive coal dust be addressed 560 times. However, management only responded 65 times.

The Upper Big Branch mine was literally a powder keg. The mine workers' investigation concluded that 29 miners died because of a corrupt corporate culture that put production ahead of human life. Massey Energy's top management was well aware of the conditions at Upper Big Branch mine. They knew of the mountains of citations for dangerous conditions, but all they had to do was file an appeal to get Federal safety officials to back off.

Massey also obstructed mine safety inspections by illegally alerting operations of an inspector on the property so they could cover up any noticeable problems. And management knew that workers were complaining about the conditions below ground. But all Massey had to do was remind these miners that they were free to find other employment if they continued to speak up.

Corporate officers didn't mince words when it came to production over safe-

ty. In a "RUN COAL" memo from CEO Don Blankenship in 2005, he told his workers their only concern was to produce coal. The message was clear from the very top: produce coal, disregard safety problems or find another job. Miners of Upper Big Branch and other Massey mines have told Congress and investigators similar stories. To enforce their perverse philosophy, top management demanded reports every 30 minutes on how much their mines were producing.

It is clear that Massey Energy management actively disregarded their workers' health and safety. Unfortunately, the knowing violation of a mandatory health and safety standard is only a misdemeanor, no matter how many miners are killed. This kind of conduct needs to be made a felony, but efforts to increase sanctions have been stifled by the mining industry's lobby. Instead of being held accountable for the decisions that caused 29 deaths, Massey Energy executives got a massive \$195 million payout when they sold off their company, according to the United Mine Workers report.

Even though Don Blankenship was forced to resign following the Upper Big Branch tragedy, he pocketed \$86 million in the golden parachute when 29 of the miners under his jurisdiction and responsibility were killed. If you wonder why people are talking about the 1 percent and the 99 percent, the 99 percent in the mine had their lives put in danger every day they went to work for Massey. And every day they questioned it, they were threatened with job loss. But the 1 percent—the 1 percent—walked away with \$195 million for overseeing one of the most dangerous mining operations in the history of this country.

What about the families of the breadwinners of the 99 percent? They lost their breadwinner, they lost their husband, they lost their father, and they lost their brother. Now we understand

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.



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